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a b s t r a c t
An essential, but nevertheless often neglected, objective for the design of safety-critical IEEE
802.11p-based application is: fail-safety. A fail-safe application is an application that incor-
porates features that automatically counteract the effect of anticipated sources of failure. In
the context of a rear-end collision avoidance application two main possible sources of failure
exist: an unpredictable human behavior and unreliable communication. This paper presents
mechanisms that, when integrated into the design of rear-end collision avoidance applica-
tion, counteract these failure cases and thus ensure fail-safety. However, fail-safety comes at a
cost: either large inter-vehicle distances have to be kept to ensure that all drivers have enough
time to react or the application has to take over vehicle control to allow smaller inter-vehicle
distances and thus higher traﬃc eﬃciency. In this paper we analyze this tradeoff and quan-
tify what part of drivers’ population has to be deprived of vehicle control in order to achieve
acceptable traﬃc eﬃciency when deploying IEEE 802.11p-based rear-end collision avoidance
application.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The main motivation behind vehicular communication
research is to explore the possibility of IEEE 802.11p commu-
nication to contribute to safer and more eﬃcient road traf-
ﬁc. Various applications are envisioned to assist the driver in
different traﬃc situations, e.g., on intersection crossing [1] or
in the traﬃc ﬂow [2]. Applications are anticipated to notify
the driver, e.g., as in forward collision warning or even take
over the vehicle control, e.g., as in rear-end collision avoid-
ance (RECA).
In order to determine whether a particular IEEE 802.11p-
based application is feasible, its application logic has to be
carefully and clearly designed. One of the most important
design features for virtually any system, but especially for
safety-critical applications is fail-safety. According to the∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +4972160845783.
E-mail address: jens.mittag@gmail.com (J. Mittag).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2015.08.006
1570-8705/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access artideﬁnition of Merriam–Webster dictionary, we consider a
fail-safe application to be an application “that incorporates
features for automatically counteracting the effect of an an-
ticipated possible source of failure”. At the same time, the
design of a driver assistance application has to pursue an
eﬃciency objective, i.e. it should yield a reasonable traf-
ﬁc ﬂow. Obviously, this is a trade-off situation as traﬃc
safety and traﬃc eﬃciency sometimes have contradicting
requirements.
Driver assistance applications that are based on in-vehicle
sensors, like cameras or radars, are being also researched and
designed e.g., [3], and even standardized, e.g., ISO 15623 [4].
In-vehicle sensors have their limitations, e.g., sensitivity to
weather conditions [5] and to interference [6]. Furthermore,
many of these sensor-based applications rely on the driver to
take actions, which makes the effectiveness of these systems
highly dependent on the adequate response of the drivers.
As recent tendencies move towards automated driving, it is
now possible to extend fail-safe features beyond the purecle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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work is not to substitute sensor-based applications but to ex-
plore new opportunities enabled by communication and po-
tential synergy approaches [5].
In this paper we design an IEEE 802.11p-based RECA
application following a fail-safe objective. We focus on
two main sources of failure that can deteriorate fail-safety:
unpredictable driver behavior and an unreliable wireless
communication. To counteract the aforementioned sources
of failure the designed application assumes (1) worst case
situation changes during the packet inter-reception time and
(2) automatic braking in case the driver fails to adequately
react to the warning. The application either imposes large
inter-vehicle distances to ensure that all drivers have enough
time to react, or it takes over vehicle control to allow smaller
inter-vehicle distances and thus higher traﬃc eﬃciency.
We analyze this tradeoff and quantify what part of driver’s
population has to be deprived of vehicle control in order to
achieve acceptable traﬃc ﬂows. We compare the resulting
traﬃc densities to the highway level of services [7] and with
Germany’s road traﬃc regulations. We further evaluate the
feasibility of IEEE 802.11p communication to support the fail-
safe rear-end collision avoidance application under resulting
traﬃc densities by looking at the resulting channel loads.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the
related work on existing rear-end collision avoidance appli-
cations. In Section 3, we ﬁrst outline made assumptions and
then the design of a fail-safe rear-end collision avoidance ap-
plication. In Section 4, we evaluate resulting traﬃc eﬃciency
and evaluate the corresponding IEEE 802.11p communication
channel load. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Related work
Several driver-assistance applications address or are re-
lated to rear-end collisions in one degree or another. Those
are: Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), Platooning, Forward Col-
lision Warning (FCW), Rear-End Collision Avoidance (RECA)
and Emergency Electronic Brake Lights (EEBL). An ACC is
an application that automatically adjusts vehicle’s speed to
maintain a safe distance to a vehicle ahead, thus relieving
a driver from frequent alternating between braking and ac-
celeration. A Platooning is an approach to group moving ve-
hicles in order to decrease the distance between them, thus
increasing the road capacity. As opposite to optimizing driv-
ing comfort or traﬃc eﬃciency, an FCW and an RECA appli-
cations aim to improve traﬃc safety by mitigating or avoid-
ing rear-end collisions. A FCW provides a warning to a driver
in case of a potential rear-end collision, and a RECA appli-
cation additionally includes an automatic braking in case a
driver did not respond suﬃciently. The automatic braking of
RECA application is typically preceded by a warning, as in
FCW. Obviously, the ACC and Platooning are susceptible to
rear-end collisions and, as a result, are often combined with
FCW or RECA. All these applications share similar hardware
equipment, i.e. a sensor to measure the distance to the ve-
hicle ahead, and a global navigation satellite system (GNSS)
receiver to obtain own location data. The ﬁrst-generation
radar-based ACC, FCWand RECA applications are already sold
under various trade names and variations by different au-
tomotive manufactures. An EEBL application broadcasts in-formation in case THE own vehicle performs a sudden brak-
ing. The reception of such information, if appropriate, trig-
gers actions from FCW or RECA applications at the receiving
vehicles. The relationship between these applications are de-
scribed in several papers, e.g. by [8–10].
The predecessor of an ACC is a simple Cruise Control sys-
tem which was ﬁrst ﬁtted to vehicles as early as in 1900
[11]. The Cruise Control system is intended for the use during
long-time driving on roads with sparse traﬃc density. While
Cruise Control provides additional comfort to the driver by
maintaining a constant speed [12], Adaptive Cruise Control
relies on in-vehicle sensors to recognize an upstreammoving
vehicle and to derive the distance to that vehicle. ACC algo-
rithms adjust the speed of the own vehicle automatically in
order to maintain a safe time headway and/or a small rel-
ative speed, thus making human intervention unnecessary
[13]. Therefore, characteristics of the human driver are rel-
atively unimportant for the ACC.
The standard ISO 15622 [14] describes basic functionality
and performance requirements of an Adaptive Cruise Control.
According to Ref. [14], “the goal of ACC is a partial automation
of the longitudinal vehicle control and the reduction of the
workload of the driver with the aim of supporting and reliev-
ing the driver in a convenient manner”. The standard further
describes two types of ACC, type 1 and type 2, with the differ-
ence that ACC type 2 applies “active brake intervention with
a clutch pedal”. Yet, the deceleration is limited (shall not ex-
ceed 3.5 m/s2 averaged over 2 s) and might not be enough
to avoid a rear-end collision. As conventional ACC is not in-
tended to operate at lower speeds, a Full Speed Range Adap-
tive Cruise Control (FSRA), standardized as ISO 22179 [15]
was developed to function at all vehicle speeds, e.g. also in
congested traﬃc conditions.
ACC systemsmostly rely on a radar or a laser sensors, with
some systems utilizing a lidar or even a stereo camera [12,13].
A Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) as in [16–22],
is an extension of the ACCwhere additional information, such
as an acceleration of the leading vehicle is gained via wire-
less communication. The major beneﬁt of CACC over ACC is a
string stability.Without string stability the oscillationswhich
are introduced by braking and accelerating vehicles, can be
ampliﬁed and eventually lead to traﬃc jams or even to rear-
end collisions.
Platooning has been a topic of research for many decades
as well. Standard SAE J 2945/6, which is being developed
since January 2015, is to deﬁne the differences between Pla-
tooning and CACC, as well as the necessary communication
data exchange which is required to coordinate vehicle ma-
neuvers. With Platooning, vehicles are thought to be grouped
into platoons in order to increase the road’s capacity and
the driver’s comfort through automation. Required longitudi-
nal vehicle control algorithms, that are necessary to control
spacing between vehicles and their speed, have been pub-
lished starting 1970’s, see [23–25]. First demonstrations took
place in 1990’s and proved the technical feasibility of auto-
mated driving with Platooning [26–28]. Platooning typically
requires installation of magnetic markers on the road to fa-
cilitate vehicle tracking and to guide the steering, whereas
radars are utilized to track the distance to the following
and leading vehicles [27]. Additionally, the usage of wire-
less communication to control platoons has been increasing
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[27,28].
The ACC and Platooning systems, although include auto-
mated braking to reduce the need for the driver interven-
tion, are only designed to increase driver’s comfort and con-
venience, but not to prevent collisions, especially those that
result due to a sudden braking. For an active collision pre-
vention a system that relies on human follow-up actions, like
Forward CollisionWarning, or a system with automatic colli-
sion avoidance features, like Rear-End Collision Avoidance, is
required [29,30].
A Forward Collision Warning is a precrash safety system
that warns a driver if there is a possibility of a collision with
a preceding vehicle due to either too high relative speed or
too small inter-vehicle distance [31]. Hence, the safety ben-
eﬁt of the FCW system depends on the adequate response
of the driver, which depends on driver’s reaction behavior,
reaction time and braking intensity. The ﬁrst document con-
taining preliminary guidelines for an FCW system has been
published by SAE International in 1997 [8]. Later, in 2002 and
2013, the ISO published an ISO 15623 standard [4] describing
an FCW system.
The SAE paper deﬁnes two types of warnings: the ﬁrst
warning is addressing an inattentive driver situation and the
second warning is addressing a following-too-closely driv-
ing situation. A warning distance is calculated and compared
with the distance to the vehicle in front, and if exceeded, the
driver is warned. A limited automated braking is utilized as
a warning, rather than as a rear-end collision avoidance fea-
ture. Additionally, a “push-back” accelerator pedal warning
is foreseen, that “resists the force placed by the driver on the
accelerator pedal”. The “push-back” accelerator pedal warn-
ing is also intended to only inform the driver of following too
closely to the vehicle in front, and does not prevent the driver
from overriding the “push-back”.
The standard ISO 15623 [4] describes performance re-
quirements and test procedures for an FCW system called
a Forward Vehicle Collision Warning System (FVCWS). It is
based on a radar technology and is designed to “inform the
driver of the need to take action in order to avoid or reduce
the severity of a possible imminent rear-end collision”. The
warnings should be provided in a timely manner, so that
drivers avoid most common rear-end crashes by applying
brakes only, hence, the FVCWS do not overtake vehicle con-
trol to mitigate the crash. Although optional warning braking
is foreseen, it should last less than 1 s and should not result
in a speed reduction exceeding 2 m/s, thus not necessarily
serving as a collision avoidance feature.
A Rear-End Collision Avoidance (RECA) application, also
called Forward Collision Avoidance (FCA) or Automatic Emer-
gency Braking System (AEBS) [12], is an advanced version of
the FCW system with additional automatic braking capabil-
ity in case the driver fails to respond to the warning. The ISO
Standard 22839 [10] describes a Forward Vehicle Collision
Mitigation System (FVCMS) which is an “extension” of ISO
15623 [4]. The FVCMS automatically brakes to reduce the rel-
ative speed if the likelihood of a rear-end collision is assessed
high. The automatic braking is preceded by a warning, which
is provided in accordance with ISO 15623 [4]. The main func-
tionality, general operational limits, as well as performance
and validation requirements, are outlined in ISO 22839, al-though implementation details are left for individual manu-
factures. The average deceleration should not exceed 4.0m/s2
when a FVCMS ﬁrst initiated, and can increase up to 6.0 m/s2
(averaged over 1 s).
Similarly, the EU Regulation No. 347/2012 [32] speciﬁes
the requirements and testing procedures for advanced emer-
gency braking systems that detect a rear-end collision pos-
sibility. The advanced emergency braking systems shall warn
the driver, and if the driver takes no action, automatic braking
is applied. Some papers suggest that an automated braking
should be “a last resort” and a rear-end collision avoidance
via steering, i.e. a lane changing, should be preferred [33].
A communication-based application envisioned to ad-
dress rear-end collisions is called an Emergency Electronic
Brake Light (EEBL), or an Emergency Warning Message
(EWM): a vehicle is broadcasting a self-generated EEBL event
information to warn neighboring vehicles, cf. [34] and [35].
The EEBL application is envisioned to support not only the di-
rect and close neighbors of the broadcasting vehicle, but also
the vehicles to whom the line-of-sight is obstructed, by e.g.,
another vehicle or weather conditions. If a vehicle receives
an EEBL message from a vehicle in front, the FCW or RECA
applications shall be activated.
3. Application design
3.1. Assumptions and challenges
We assume that every vehicle possesses its current status
information such as information on its ID, speed, direction,
position, acceleration, and so on. This information comes ei-
ther from in-vehicle sensors or over satellite navigation sys-
tem and is assumed to be error-free. Mechanisms that im-
prove the accuracy of this information are not the focus of
this paper. Every vehicle has a radio transceiver and period-
ically broadcasts update messages with own status informa-
tion in order to allow the establishment of a mutual aware-
ness. The RECA application requires reception of at least one
message from a vehicle in front and in the same lane to be
activated. Based on the mutual awareness and a predeﬁned
RECA application logic, the driver is assisted with warnings
and vehicle control is taken over in case the driver does not
react in time. the In following we focus on the application
logic itself and leave hardware requirements or how a warn-
ing should be presented to a driver out of the scope of this
paper. We assume scenarios with only passenger cars with a
typical vehicle length of 5.5 m [7].
The RECA application is fail-safe if it incorporates safety
features to counteract possible sources of failure. Two main
challenges, or sources of failure exist: (1) an unpredictable
driver behavior, and (2) an unreliable communication. Though
our RECA application assumes an obedient driver who re-
sponds to a warning by deceleration, it does not know the
drivers reaction time and his applied braking intensity. These
driver behavior characteristics differ for each driver and
might even vary from one situation to another. The applica-
tion logic has to account for that in order to be fail-safe. It also
needs to possess an up-to-date awareness picture in order to
decide which action to perform. The unreliability of wireless
communication makes it impossible to know exactly when a
next update message will be received.
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Fig. 1. The typical scenario for rear-end collision avoidance application.
FV – following vehicle, LV – leading vehicle.Addressing unpredictable driver behavior
Multiple works exist that analyze driver behavior char-
acteristics like reaction time and braking intensity [3,36].
Mainly a controlled measurement of a limited driver popu-
lation for a reaction to a typical rear-end collision warning is
performed. The information is available in the form of either
mean values for reaction time and braking intensity or pre-
sented as a distribution with a mean and a variance. Accord-
ing to [3] driver’s reaction time can be modeled with a log-
normal distribution with mean = 1.3 s and deviation = 0.74 s
and braking intensity with a truncated Gaussian distribution
with mean = −0.6 g, deviation = 0.1 g, truncated by max =
−0.8 g and min − 0.3 g, where g is equivalent to ≈ 9.8m/s2.
No correlation between braking intensity and reaction time
values is typically assumed.
If application gives a warning considering the reaction
time and braking intensity of the average driver (mean val-
ues), all drivers that are “worse” than the average driver
would not be able to react adequately, i.e., application will
not be fail-safe. Therefore, in order to be fail-safe, the appli-
cation has to either give a warning accounting for the “worst
driver” or integrate automatic braking for those drivers that
fail to respond to a warning.
Addressing unreliable communication
One option to ensure fail-safety in spite of uncertainty in
between packet receptions is to assume a worst case situa-
tion change. In the case of RECA this means assuming maxi-
mum physically possible braking of the leading vehicle right
after the last message was received. Accounting for such im-
probable scenario might seem excessive, but as it is possible,
it has to be considered to ensure fail-safety.
The worst case situation change assumptions are as
follows: (1) if lead vehicle is stopped, the worst case as-
sumption is that it is still at stop. No assumption is made
that vehicle drives backwards; (2) if lead vehicle is moving
at constant speed, the worst case assumption is that lead
vehicle started deceleration with maximum physically
possible deceleration; (3) if lead vehicle is decelerating, the
worst case assumption is that lead vehicle’s deceleration has
changed to a maximum physically possible deceleration.
Resulting application logic
When referring to a rear-end collision avoidance applica-
tion or simply an application, we refer to an application run-
ning on the FV.
Application’s logic is based on the layout presented in [4]
and [2] but is reﬁned for fail-safety objective. Fig. 1 illus-trates a typical rear-end collision application scenario. Ac-
tive application calculates two distances, a warning distance
DW and an automatic braking distance DAB. These distances
separate three possible states of the application: “no warn”,
“warn” and “brake” states. Application presents a warning
to a driver of a following vehicle (FV) if he is approaching
a leading vehicle (LV) too fast, in other words, once inter-
vehicle distance (IVD) between two vehicles is equal to or
less than a warning distance. The warning distance is calcu-
lated in a way that allows the driver of the FV to react by
deceleration and come to the same speed as the LV at latest
safety distance DS away from the LV. If the driver fails to ad-
equately respond to a warning and the IVD decreases further
below the automatic braking distance: automatic braking is
started. Automatic braking distance is calculated such that it
is suﬃcient to bring the FV to the same speed as the LV with
some desired braking intensity, at latest some safety dis-
tance DS away from the LV. Hence, both distances DW and DAB
can change over time, depending on the behavior of the LV
and FV.
The matching ﬂowchart of the rear-end collision avoid-
ance application is shown in Fig. 2. Based on the input of
own information and information received from the LV ap-
plication determines inter-vehicle distance and performs cal-
culation of warning and automatic braking distances. Dur-
ing the packet inter-reception time application estimates the
speed and position of the LV with a worst case assump-
tion. Depending on DW and DAB, as well as on the cur-
rent inter-vehicle distance corresponding application’s state
is set. Such calculation happens in a periodic manner, but
can also be triggered upon reception of a new packet from
the LV.
An example of this life-cycle is shown in Fig. 3 which
compares the internally calculated and the actual warn-
ing/automatic braking distances for the LVM and LVD sce-
narios and a packet inter-reception time of 0.2 s. Every time
a new update from the LV is received, the internally calcu-
lated distances (termed worst case in the ﬁgure and calcu-
lated every 0.05 s here) and the actual distances are equal,
but begin to diverge immediately afterwards. Depending on
the difference between the actual deceleration of the LV and
the worst-case assumption, this gap can be signiﬁcant or
not.
The presented application logic, although shown for two-
vehicle case, is also fail-safe for three- and more vehicle
cases. Since application assumes the worst case situation
change, i.e., the maximum physically possible deceleration
of the leading vehicle, it does not matter whether the lead-
ing vehicle brakes on its own or because of a vehicle in front
of him.
3.2. Eﬃciency tradeoff
Adjusting the warning to consider the “average driver”
with average reaction time and average braking intensity re-
quires automatic braking for all the drivers that are “worse”
than average. The warning that accounts for “a worst driver”
results in large inter-vehicle distances, but excludes auto-
matic braking. The automatic braking does ensure fail-safety,
but takes away vehicle control from drivers. A warning that
accounts for “a best driver” will be more eﬃcient with
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Fig. 2. Flowchart of a fail-safe rear-end collision avoidance application running on the FV. FV is a following vehicle, LV is a leading vehicle, IVD is an inter-vehicle
distance, DW is a warning distance, DAB is an automatic braking distance.respect to traﬃc eﬃciency, but will require automatic brak-
ing for most of the drivers. On one side application can leave
vehicle control to the drivers and would never have to auto-
matically brake, but have to deal with highly ineﬃcient traf-
ﬁc. On the other side, application can be highly eﬃcient with
respect to the traﬃc, and be a fully automated system with
no control left for the drivers. Both systems are fail-safe.
3.3. Pre-crash scenarios
Rear-end crashes account for 32.9% of all accidents ac-
cording to Ref. [37]. Following we describe the most frequentpre-crash scenarios that result in a rear-end collision in order
to evaluate our application [5].
Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS)
According to Harding et al. [5] 61% of all rear-end crashes
involving light vehicles were preceded by a lead vehicle
stopped scenario. The relative speed in LVS scenario can be
small, e.g., 50 km/h, representing urban scenario where FV is
approaching the LV that is stopped at intersection. The rela-
tive speed can also be large, e.g., larger than 100 km/h, repre-
senting highway scenarios, where FV is approaching a traﬃc
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Fig. 3. Worst case assumption of the application on warning DW and auto-
matic braking distances DAB based on information updates every IRT = 0.2
s, together with the actual values, assuming aLV stays the same. At time 0 s
vF = 130km/h, vL = 100km/h.




















Fig. 4. Distribution of reaction time and braking intensity according to
Brunson et al. [3].jam or a broken vehicle. The warning distance is calculated
as follows:
DW = (vF − vL)
2
−2aF
+ (vF − vL) · (tR + tsys) + DS (1)
where vF and vL are speed of FV and LV respectively (vF > vL,
vL = 0), tR is a reaction time of FV’s driver and aF his braking
intensity, tsys is a system delay and DS is a desired safety gap
at which FV wishes to come to the same speed as LV. In our
study we set tsys = 0 and DS = 1m. An automatic braking dis-
tance DAB is calculated similarly to Eq. 1, with tR = 0 and aF
as a braking intensity used by application, we set aF to maxi-
mum physically possible deceleration of −0.8g, other values
can be used for smoother automatic braking.
Lead Vehicle Decelerating (LVD)
According to Harding et al. [5] 25% of all rear-end crashes
involving light vehicles were preceded by a lead vehicle de-
celerating scenario. If a LV is decelerating the warning dis-












where vF > vL, aF < 0, aL is an acceleration of LV (aL < 0). We
use tsys = 0 and DS = 1m. Automatic braking distance calcu-
lation follows the Eq. 2 with tR = 0 and aF set to maximum
physically possible deceleration of −0.8g.Lead Vehicle Moving (LVM)
According to Harding et al. [5] 13% of all rear-end crashes
involving light vehicles were preceded by a lead vehiclemov-
ing scenario for which calculation of a warning distance is
performed as in Eq. 1, where speed of FV is larger than speed
of LV and speed of LV is larger than zero, vF > vL > 0. Au-
tomatic braking distance calculation follows the Eq. 1 with




Weprovide an analytical study for the evaluation of traﬃc
and communication performance based on kinematic laws
and an empirical communication model [38] that calculates
the probability of packet reception based on the number of
vehicles in the neighborhood, their beaconing rate, the size
of a single beacon message, and the applied transmission
power. We believe that a more red simulation model does
not provide more insights for the indicators of our study as
the used empirical model is already based on the results of
detailed simulation studies. The underlying network simula-
tions employed rather pessimistic radio propagation condi-
tions at short distances, i.e., distances smaller than 100 m.
Hence the probabilities of packet reception, as calculated by
the empirical model, are lower than what can be expected in
reality. Yet, a more realistic model will be required in case of
an evaluation of traﬃc ﬂow smoothness, e.g. when looking
at adaptive cruise control applications, however, this is out of
scope of this study.
In the following we calculate the maximum warning and
automatic braking distances that result due to various IRTs,
instead of showing the evolution of DW and DAB over time as
in Fig. 3.
To evaluate and quantify the safety-eﬃciency tradeoff we
ﬁrst, generated “driver proﬁles” with reaction time and brak-
ing intensity given in [3]. Fig. 4 shows the distribution of re-
action time and distribution of braking intensity. We gener-
ated 500 samples with each distribution, thus each “driver
proﬁle” or simply a driver represents a combination from one
sample out of reaction time distribution and one sample out
of braking intensity distribution, totaling of 250,000 drivers.
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Table 1
The multi-lane highway Level of Services for a free-ﬂow speed of 100 km/h, according to
exhibit 21–2 in [7].
LOS Description Max. Veh. Density Ø Speed
[veh/km/ln] [km/h]
A complete free ﬂow 7 100.0
B free ﬂow 11 100.0
C marked inﬂuence of other vehicles presence 16 98.4
D traﬃc congestion 22 91.5
E near capacity, unstable level 25 88.0
Fig. 5. Lead vehicle stopped scenario.For each pre-crash scenario and for each of the 250,000
drivers, the “individual warning distance” is calculated ac-
cording to formulas given in Section 3.3. The CDF of these
warning distances shows the warning distances that provide
enough time for a certain amount of driver population to re-
act. If application gives a warning that allows enough time to
react to e.g., 90% of all drivers, then for 10% of all drivers au-
tomatic braking is needed. The automation level refers to this
share of drivers that require automatic braking and thus are
deprived of a vehicle control. The traﬃc density calculation
is possible in the following way: if the warning distance that
suits 90% of all drivers is at IVD of 194.5 m then, account-
ing average vehicle length of 5.5 m, the possible traﬃc den-
sity for a fail-safe rear-end collision avoidance application is
5 veh/km/lane.
We compare the resulting vehicle density with the Level
of Services (LOS) provided by the Highway Capacity Manual
[7]. The Level of Service (LOS) characterizes the performance
of portions of the transportation system. Table 1 summarizes
these LOS classes for a multi-lane highway with their cor-
responding maximum vehicle density and average vehicle
speed.
We further compare the IVD against road traﬃc regula-
tions in Germany which indicate that the minimum inter-
vehicle distance should be large enough to ensure enough
space to react for a sudden braking of the LV. The penalty
starts when speed is larger than 80 km/h and IVD is less than
a quarter of the speedometer value in meters.
At last, we evaluate the feasibility of IEEE 802.11p to sup-
port a fail-safe RECA application for the investigated sce-
narios and resulting traﬃc densities. In particular, it might
be counter-productive to increase automation level in or-
der to accommodate higher vehicle densities, not only due
to decrease of LOS, but also due to resulting congestion in
the communication channel. We make use of the empiri-
cal model presented in [38] and the awareness principles
described in [39]. The empirical model accounts for radio
propagation with Nakagami m = 3, inputs default packet
size of 400 bytes, variable parameters like vehicle density,
transmission power and rate, and calculates the correspond-
ing probability of packet reception. The awareness principle
is based on the calculated probability of packet reception,
and determines the awareness distance at which n packets
within a time window T are received with a certain prob-
ability (set to 99.99% in our evaluation if not stated other-
wise). We assume that all vehicles communicate with the
same transmission rate of 10 Hz while the transmission
power is adjusted to “guarantee” the reception at variouswarning distances. Please refer to [38] and [39] for more
details.
4.2. Results
Lead vehicle stopped scenario
If LV is stopped and the worst case assumption between
packet reception is that the LV is still at stop, then the du-
ration of packet inter-reception time does not play a role in
calculation of DW or DAB.
Fig. 5 a plots the CDF of the warning distance for the gen-
erated driver proﬁles using different speeds for the FV. As
can be seen, most of the drivers share a similar warning dis-
tance, and the warning distance decreases with decreasing
FV speed. For instance, if the curve for FV speed of 80 km/h
is considered, a warning distance of 143 m is necessary to
provide enough reaction time to 99% of all drivers, which
in turn translates to a vehicle density of 6.73 vehicles/km
per lane (cf. Fig. 5b). In terms of LOS this maps to a com-
pletely free ﬂow level of A. On the contrary, if only 1% of all
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Table 2
Awareness distances in a LVS scenario with 8 lanes, a FV speed of
50 km/h, a transmission power that equals a 100 m communication
range, and a 10 Hz beaconing rate. The offered channel load is 2.41 Mbps
which equals approx. 40% in a 6 Mbps conﬁguration. In comparison, the
warning distance is 16 m and the automatic braking distance is 14 m in
this scenario.
Prob. of awareness (%) Time window (i.e. IRT)
0.2 s 0.4 s 0.6 s 0.8 s 1.0 s
99.9999 0 m 6 m 18 m 26 m 31 m
99.999 0 m 12 m 23 m 30 m 35 m
99.99 1 m 18 m 28 m 35 m 39 m
99.9 6 m 26 m 35 m 41 m 45 m
Fig. 6. LVM and LVD Scenario for vF = 130km/h and vL = 100km/h for dif-
ferent IRTs.drivers is given enough time to react, a warning distance of
47 m is suﬃcient, which in turn translates to a vehicle den-
sity of 19.05 vehicles/km per lane and a congested traﬃc sit-
uation (LOS D). In both cases, the automatic breaking dis-
tance for the moving vehicles is 33 m, which, compared to
German traﬃc regulations, is still above the penalty thresh-
old of 20m. The comparison also holds for all other automatic
braking distances at higher FV speeds, which are shown in
the legend of Fig. 5a.
With respect to the question whether IEEE 802.11p is able
to fulﬁll the RECA application requirements, it is best to take
a look at the most demanding scenario: FV speed of 50 km/h
and automation level of 100%. In this scenario, a warning
distance of 16 m is necessary, which translates to a vehicle
density of 46.5 vehicles/km per lane. As the answer to this
question is not black and white, Table 2 lists the awareness
distances for different awareness probabilities and time win-
dows for a 8-lane highway conﬁguration. As can be seen, the
achievable awareness distance is lowest for a high probabil-
ity requirement and a short time window. When comparing
these awareness distances with the warning distance of 16 m
and the automatic braking distance of 14 m (cf. Fig. 5a) it
becomes clear that a very high awareness probability, and
hence a high level of safety, is only achievable for a time win-
dow of 0.6 s and greater. In non-technical terms, this means
that a time window of 0.6 s is suﬃcient to detect a LVS sit-
uation with a 99.9999% probability and react in time. For
lower detection times only lower probabilities are feasible.
If shorter detection windows are envisioned, a lower aware-
ness probability has to be accepted.
It should be noted that the above calculations are based
onworst case assumptions: ﬁrst, a FV speed of 50 km/h is not
realistic if all other vehicles share an IVD of 16 m. Second, the
used empirical communication model assumes strong fading
even at close distances, which is not in line with what ﬁeld
tests have shown.
Lead vehicle moving and lead vehicle decelerating scenarios
Fig. 6a shows the CDF of the warning distance for both,
the LVM and LVD scenarios. Their results match each other
if IRT > 0 as they only differ in the actual deceleration value
of LV, which is aL = 0 in the LVM scenario and aL = −0.6g in
the LVD scenario. This value however does not have an im-
pact on the calculation of the RECA application as it always
assumes the worst case deceleration of LV, i.e. a = −0.8g.LAs can be seen in Fig. 6a, the IRT has a strong impact on the
warning and automatic braking distance, and the gap to the
curve for IRT= 0 is most signiﬁcant in the LVM case. The LVM
scenario is not the most challenging, but the one that results
in the largest error. We focus on both, LVM and LVD, since
their worst case assumption is the same.
Fig. 6b shows the achievable vehicle densities for the
different conﬁgurations with respect to the applied level
of automation. If an IRT of 0.2 s and an automation level of
zero is targeted, the warning distance equals approx. 236 m,
which translates to a vehicle density of 4.14 vehicles/km
per lane. By increasing the automation level to 1, i.e. such
that all drivers are too slow to react in time, the warning
distance reduces to 49 m, which translates to a vehicle
density of 18.34 vehicles/km per lane. Whether the wireless
communication system is able to provide a reliable service
in this setup is answered by Fig. 7. Fig. 7a and b plot the
maximum achievable awareness reliability and the resulting
channel load (in Mbps) for the above scenario (IRT=0.2 s)
with respect to the automation level and the number of
lanes considered. Each shown reliability value stems from
the optimal combination of transmit power and transmis-
sion range. As can be seen, the reliability increases with
an increasing automation level as long 6 lanes or less are
considered. The reliability reaches even 100% in the 2 lanes
setup if the automation level is above 10%. In the 8 lane and
10 lane scenario, the wireless communication system is not
able to provide a highly reliable service, and the increase of
the automation level helps only up to a certain point. A look
at Fig. 7b further reveals that the offered load never exceeds
1.6 Mbps, which is less than 27% of the available 6 Mbps.
Please note that the load curves vary with respect to the
automation level and that no clear tendency is visible. This is
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Fig. 7. Maximum achievable awareness reliabilities (i.e. awareness probabilities) at the respective warning distances (sub-ﬁgures (a), (c) and (e)) as well as the
resulting channel load in Mbps (sub-ﬁgures (b), (d) and (f)), both with respect to the automation level and the number of lanes considered.a result of the fact that different transmission rate and range
combinations yield the optimal awareness reliability.
When considering an IRT of 0.4 or 0.6 s, the wireless
communication system is less challenged, as can be seen in
Fig. 7c–f. Consequently, higher awareness reliabilities can be
achieved. This is to be expected as an increase of the IRT in-
creases the time windows during which at least one packet
has to be received successfully. At the same time, the load on
the wireless channel is kept at a similar level as before.
4.3. Discussion
We investigated the most frequent pre-crash scenarios
to evaluate the maximum traﬃc densities that are sup-
ported by fail-safe rear-end collision avoidance application.
Designed fail-safe application does not aim to minimize nui-
sance alerts, resulting in a non-optimal IVDs when obedi-
ent driver is assumed. Nevertheless, such IVDs allow reason-
able traﬃc density that can be reﬂected by highway level of
services, up to LOS E. Moreover, by adjusting the automa-
tion level application can control the maximum traﬃc den-sity. The IEEE 802.11p communication can support commu-
nication in resulting traﬃc densities if scaled up to an 8-
lane highway with reasonable channel load of around 40%.
The possibility for nuisance alerts comes due to a non-zero
packet IRT when the difference between actual traﬃc situa-
tion and what application assumes to ensure fail-safety oc-
curs. There are multiple ways to reduce this discrepancy and
thus nuisance alert probability. For example, it is safe to as-
sume that the LV will transmit the Decentralized Environ-
mental Notiﬁcation Message (DENM) in case of emergency
braking [5]. Thus, application’s logic can assume less intense
braking as a worst case traﬃc situation change assumption.
Adaptive transmission rates, especially when IVD is close to
DW or DAB, could help reducing the nuisance alert probabil-
ity as well as hybrid approach of IEEE 802.11p communica-
tion together with sensor-based technologies, e.g., a radar. In
hybrid approach the weakness of one technology can be sup-
ported by the strength of the other, as also has been pointed
out in [5]. These techniques may help maintain the warning
distance accuracy within ± 15% foreseen in the ISO 15623
standard [4].
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In the current paper we presented a methodology to de-
sign a fail-safe rear-end collision avoidance application that
is purely based on IEEE 802.11p. As expected, our results state
that higher traﬃc densities can be achieved if control is taken
away from the user and delegated to the application. We
further quantiﬁed this relationship between the level of au-
tomation, i.e. the amount of drivers that have to give up ve-
hicle control to the application, and the resulting traﬃc ef-
ﬁciency. This understanding is essential in order to properly
balance this trade-off and to smoothen the transition from
semi- to fully-automated traﬃc. The resulting traﬃc densi-
ties match to the highway LOS that are seen on today’s high-
ways. Moreover, the IEEE 802.11p communication is able to
support traﬃc density on highways with up to 8-lanes while
generating acceptable channel loads of around 40%. The de-
signed application logic, although shown on a two-vehicle
case example is also fail-safe and traﬃc eﬃcient for a three-
and more vehicle case.
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